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tal in nature, such as severe emotional trauma or nervousness." In Dillon
the injury seems to have been primarily emotional in character, although
the extent of any "physical" side effects is not ascertainable from the
court's opinion." Apparently the California court has construed the term
"physical injury" to allow recovery for symptoms which most jurisdic-
tions would term emotional.
IV. CONCLUSION
The California supreme court has not completely abandoned the zone
of danger concept, but has enlarged it to incorporate foreseeability of
mental as well as physical injury. It is significant to note that the court
expressly limited the application of its guidelines to the specific facts of
Dillon. The majority refused to speculate on the implications of its hold-
ing, asserting that future recovery must be on a case-by-case basis. Al-
though the guidelines are vague, it is difficult to imagine any guidelines
that would not fall victim to this criticism. The extent to which the
Dillon doctrine is applied will depend upon the degree of foreseeability
the courts are willing to attribute to the defendant in each specific in-
stance. Since California has been more liberal than most jurisdictions"
in compensating mental suffering, it may be concluded that Dillon will
be followed elsewhere only as courts become more willing to expand re-
covery for mental injuries."
Diane Poe
Pittman v. State: The Death Penalty and Texas Jurors
The Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provides that in any capital
case in which the state is seeking the death penalty, challenges to jurors
are either peremptory or for cause. Both the state and the defense are al-
lowed fifteen peremptory challenges' which may be used without giving
" "The nerves, and nerve centers of the body are a part of the physical system, and are
not only susceptible of lesion from external causes, but are also liable to be weakened and des-
troyed from causes primarily acting upon the mind. If these nerves, or the entire nervous
system, are thus affected, there is a physical injury thereby produced; and, if the primal cause
of this injury is tortious, it is immaterial whether it is direct, as by a blow, or indirect through
some action upon the mind." Sloane v. Southern Cal. Ry., 111 Cal. 668, 44 P. 320, 322 (1896).
See also Easton v. United Trade School Contracting Co., 173 Cal. 199, 159 P. 597 (1916); Emden
v. Vitz, 88 Cal. App. 313, 198 P.2d 696 (1948).
20It was not necessary for the trial court to consider the physical effects because it ruled
the mother was outside the zone of danger and so granted a summary judgment against her.
as See language of State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330, 240 P.2d 282
(1952). See also definition of physical injury, note 29 supra.
a" Texas courts have stood firm in denying the existence of mental suffering as a separate tort.
Even should recovery be broadened, Texas would continue to speak of recovery for mental suffer-
ing only in terms of an intentional tort. See Fisher v. Carrousel Motor Hotel, Inc., 414 S.W.2d
774 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967), noted in 22 Sw. L.J. 669 (1968).
1TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 35.13 (1965).
2 Id. art. 35.15 (1965). The trial court may grant additional peremptory challenges at its dis-
cretion. Enriquez v. State, 429 S.W.2d 141, 145 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968).
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any reason for excluding the prospective jurors.' While there is no limit
to the number of challenges for cause which can be exercised by either
party, such challenges must be supported by facts that render the juror
incapable or unfit to serve on the jury." One circumstance in which a
juror can be challenged for cause by the state is "that the juror has con-
scientious scruples in regard to the infliction of the punishment of death
for crime, . . . where the state is seeking the death penalty."'
Recently, in Witherspoon v. Illinois,' the United States Supreme Court
considered the question of whether the exclusion of prospective jurors by
a challenge for cause on the basis of conscientious scruples against the
death penalty is consistent with the requirements of the sixth and four-
teenth amendments. The Court held that due process forbids the carrying
out of a death sentence if jurors were excluded from the jury which im-
posed or recommended the sentence simply because they voiced general
objections to or expressed conscientious scruples against capital punish-
ment.' Under the Witherspoon standard a prospective juror can be ex-
cluded for his opposition to the death penalty only when such opposition
is expressed in an unambiguous declaration that the juror is irrevocably
committed to an automatic vote against capital punishment regardless
of the facts that might emerge at trial.
Shortly after Witherspoon, the Texas court of criminal appeals de-
cided Pittman v. State. The Pittinan court was confronted with deter-
mining whether the Texas practice of challenging for cause jurors who
express conscientious scruples against the death penalty meets the Wither-
spoon standard.
I. WITHERSPOON V. ILLINOIS
Witherspoon was convicted of murder in 1960 in Cook County, Illi-
nois, and the jury fixed the punishment at death. At the time the With-
erspoon jury was impaneled, an Illinois statute provided that prospective
jurors could be challenged for cause if they expressed conscientious
scruples against or opposition to the death penalty.9 During voir dire ex-
amination, forty-seven jurors were excluded under the authority of this
statute. Only five of those excluded stated that they could never vote for
the death penalty. The Illinois supreme court affirmed the conviction and
sentence of death." The United States Supreme Court reversed the Illi-
'TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 35.14 (1965).
4 Id. art. 35.16(a).
'Id. art. 35.16(b)].
'391 U.S. 510 (1968).
"In limiting the decision to the issue of punishment the Court left open the possibility that in
some future case a defendant might be able to show that such a jury is not only more prone to
impose the death penalty but is also more prone to convict. Id. at 520 n.18.
8434 S.W.2d 352 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968).
9'.In trials for murder it shall be cause for challenge of any juror who shall, on being ex-
amined, state that he has conscientious scruples against capital punishment, or that he is opposed
to the same." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, 5 743 (1959). This statute was not enacted in the 1963
revision of the Illinois Code of Criminal Procedure, but the Illinois Supreme Court has held that
S 115-4(d) incorporates former § 743. People v. Hobbs, 35 I1. 2d 263, 274, 220 N.E.2d 469, 475
(1966).
'a 36 Ill. 2d 471, 224 N.E.2d 259 (1967).
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nois court on the issue of punishment.11 The Court held that the chal-
lenge for cause of prospective jurors who voiced only general opposition
to the death penalty violated the constitutional right of the accused to a
fair and impartial jury."2 In arriving at this decision the Court reasoned
that a man who personally opposes capital punishment, no less than one
who favors it, can subordinate his personal views to his duty as a juror.
Witherspoon appears to formulate definite standards which state courts
must apply in future voir dire examinations where the state is seeking
the death penalty. The dissenting opinion of Justice Black points out that
"if we are to take the [majority] opinion literally"'" the state will be
required to cease asking the juror whether or not he has conscientious
scruples against capital punishment. Instead, the inquiry would be whether
the juror would automatically vote against capital punishment without
regard to the evidence that might emerge at trial. However, since the
Witherspoon opinion is quite ambiguous,' only speculation can be offered
as to its application in future cases by the Supreme Court." The decision
certainly does not affect the right of the state to exclude potential jurors
who would automatically vote against the death penalty in all cases or
whose attitude toward the death penalty would prevent them from mak-
ing an impartial decision as to the guilt or innocence of the accused.
II. PITTMAN V. STATE
During the process of impaneling a jury in the murder trial of Pitt-
man, at which the state was seeking the death penalty, one hundred and
twenty-six prospective jurors were examined. Of these, forty-two were
challenged for cause because they expressed some degree of opposition to
capital punishment. At the trial Pittman was found guilty and the jury
assessed the death penalty. On appeal to the Texas court of criminal ap-
peals, attorneys for Pittman, relying on Witherspoon, argued that the ex-
clusion under a challenge for cause of all veniremen who expressed any
opposition to the death penalty denied Pittman his constitutional right
to a fair and impartial jury and was a denial of due process of law."
"See note 7 supra.
1389 U.S. 1035 (1968).
13 391 U.S. at 538.
'" See dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Black in which he discusses the ambiguity of the ma-
jority opinion. Id.
"5 What effect would Witherspoon have in a case where a death penalty had been imposed by
a jury from which some jurors whose answers made it doubtful that they would ever vote for
capital punishment were challenged for cause, while others who expressed mere opposition to the
death penalty were included in the jury? If the "literal meaning" of the majority opinion is applied
such a case would be reversed as Justice Black points out in his dissenting opinion. A better solution
would be to give equal consideration to both the beliefs of the final jury panel and to those who
were excluded from the jury. A consideration of the beliefs of the final panel is equally valid as
that of the potential jurors who were challenged for cause. If the final jury is composed of a cross-
section of the conscience of the community, the exclusion of a few persons whose answers made
it doubtful that they could ever vote for the death penalty should not result in a reversal. The
discretion of the trial judge in excluding such doubtful jurors should be upheld, so long as those
with simple conscientious scruples or mere opposition to the death penalty are not excluded by a
challenge for cause.
"ISee Brief for Appellant at 2-4, 20-122, Pittman v. State, 434 S.W.2d 352 (Tex. Crim. App.
1968), for a discussion of thirteen other points of error raised on appeal.
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In affirming the conviction and death sentence,"7 the Texas court dis-
tinguished the present case from Witherspoon. The court reasoned that,
unlike Witherspoon, there was no effort made to exclude all "conscientious
objectors" without first determining if their scruples would compel them
to vote against the death penalty regardless of the facts that might emerge
at trial. In support of this assertion, the court stated that its study of the
voir dire examination revealed that thirty-eight" of the forty-two pros-
pective jurors who were challenged for cause stated that they would not
vote for the death penalty in any case."9 While the court viewed the an-
swers of three of the remaining four jurors as less than ideally unam-
biguous as to whether they would always vote against the death penalty,
their exclusion was sustained. Justification for this action was found in
the traditional Texas practice of recognizing the discretion of the trial
judge in sustaining a challenge for cause where the juror's view of capital
punishment makes it doubtful that he would vote for infliction of the
death penalty. In ruling that the state did not cross the "line of neutral-
ity"'" by impaneling a jury which would be unable to render an impartial
decision on the issue of punishment, the court viewed the impact of
Witherspoon on Texas practice as minimal.
Although the exact meaning of "conscientious scruples" is ambiguous,
two things are relatively clear with regard to the Texas practice of ex-
cluding potential jurors with such "scruples" against capital punishment.
As indicated by Pittman, the traditional Texas practice is to inquire
17Pittman v. State, 434 S.W.2d 352, 356 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968).
" This number does not include one prospective juror who was challenged for cause after having
stated that she knew a husband and wife, for whose murder Pittman was also under indictment.
19 Pittman's attorneys assert that twenty-three jurors were challenged on less than Witherspoon
standards. Brief of Amicus Curiae at Appendix, Pittman v. State, 434 S.W.2d 352 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1968), sets the number at sixteen. A study of the voir dire record by the author of this note
reveals that three jurors [numbers (19), (29) and (90)] were challenged for cause on the basis
of simple opposition or conscientious scruples to capital punishment. Seven other prospective jurors
were challenged on the basis of answers which left doubt as to whether or not they could vote for
the extreme penalty. The examination of juror number (19) is typical of those who were excluded
on the basis of less than Witherspoon standards. Juror (19) was asked, "[D]o you feel that you
could vote for the death penalty or do you feel that you would have conscientious scruples against
the giving of the death penalty . . . ?" Answer -"I don't believe in the death penalty." Question -
"You don't believe in the death penalty?" Answer-"I don't think so." After having been chal-
lenged for cause by the state, Juror (19) was questioned by Pittman's attorney who asked, "Could
you imagine of any case so heinous . . . that you could vote for the death penalty if you were
taken as a juror?" Answer - "Well, I said I didn't believe in it but I might be convinced on
it. ... Question-"If the evidence were strong enough to satisfy you . . . could you vote for
the death penalty?" Answer-"Well, I really, I probably would be, I probably would after not
believing in it." The answers of Juror (19) reveal that while she personally opposed capital punish-
ment, she could nevertheless "subordinate her personal views to her duty as a juror." Record at
401-02, Pittman v. State, 434 S.W.2d 352 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968).
"' The court emphasized that the present Code of Criminal Procedure contains ample safeguards
to protect the accused. First, the defendant must be given fifteen days written notice prior to the
trial if the state intends to seek the death penalty. TEx. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 1.14 (1965).
After such notice is given, the defendant may enter a plea of guilty before the court, waive trial
by jury, and under no circumstances can the death penalty be imposed. It should be noted that the
United States Supreme Court recently held a similar provision of the Federal Kidnapping Act
unconstitutional. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968). The Court reasoned that the
provision of a statute which permits imposition of the death penalty only upon defendants who
assert their right to a jury trial, violates the Fifth and Sixth Amendments by needlessly discouraging
a defendant from exercising his right to plead innocent and demand a jury trial. Following the
Supreme Court's decision in Jackson, the South Carolina Supreme Court held a statute similar
to that in Texas to be unconstitutional. State v. Harper, 162 S.E.2d 712 (S.C. 1968).
1969] NOTES
whether these "scruples" would cause the juror to vote against the ex-
treme penalty in every case, regardless of the facts and circumstances that
might emerge at trial. 1 If this is answered in the affirmative, the juror is
properly challenged for cause and excluded from the jury. However,
where the juror's answers leave some doubt as to whether he would al-
ways vote against the death penalty, the challenge for cause also may be
sustained within the discretion of the trial judge.2 In Pittman the court
of criminal appeals concluded that the latter practice did not violate the
Witherspoon standard.
III. CONCLUSION
It appears that the effect of Witherspoon on Texas practice will be
more significant than the court admits. The practice of excluding under a
challenge for cause jurors whose answers make it doubtful as to whether
they would vote to inflict the death penalty seemingly does not meet the
Witherspoon standards of "unambiguous statement," 3 "irrevocable com-
mitment,"' and "automatic vote."'
To put the effect of Witherspoon on Texas practice into perspective the
following conclusions are relevant:
(1) The state must attempt to ascertain whether the prospective juror
would invariably vote against the infliction of the death penalty.
(2) If a prospective juror states that he could never vote for capital
punishment in any case under any circumstances, he can be chal-
lenged for cause and excluded from the jury.
(3) A jury selected by challenging for cause all veniremen whose an-
swers reveal that they are less than automatically committed to
vote against capital punishment does not meet the requirements of
due process.
25 While no cases were found on point, this practice seems to be a logical result of the procedure
used in the voir dire examination in capital cases in Texas. The prospective juror is questioned first
by the state and then passed to the defense. If the state challenges a juror prematurely, the defense
may be able to qualify the juror on further examination. In that event the state would be forced
to exercise a peremptory challenge or accept a juror who may be offended by the premature chal-
lenge for cause by the state.
" Conscientious scruples regarding the death penalty in a capital case have always been viewed
as a sufficient basis on which to sustain a challenge for cause in Texas. Luton v. State, 171 Tex.
Crim. 441, 350 S.W.2d 852 (1961); Burrell v. State, 18 Tex. 713 (1857). In 1856 the Texas
Supreme Court sustained such a challenge based on simple conscientious scruples to the death penalty
holding that "no man should be placed in a position where he is required to do violence to his con-
science." White v. State, 16 Tex. 207, 218 (1856). In reasoning that a juror in such a position is
likely to regard his own conscience of higher obligation than his duty as a juror, the court handed
down the guidelines which have been followed in sustaining a challenge for cause based on simple
objection or conscientious scruples to the infliction of the death penalty. Enriques v. State, 429
S.W.2d 141, 145 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968); Ellison v. State, 419 S.W.2d 849, 851 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1967) (in which the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals upheld the validity of TEx. CODE
CRiM. PRoc. ANN. art. 35.15(b), § 1 (1965)); Crain v. State, 394 S.W.2d 165 (Tex. Crim. App.
1964); Luton v. State, 171 Tex. Crim. 441, 350 S.W.2d 853 (1961); Brewer v. State, 145 Tex.
Crim. 331, 167 S.W.2d 747 (1942); Anderson v. State, 129 Tex. Crim. 586, 90 S.W.2d 564 (1936);
Vickers v. State, 92 Tex. Crim. 182, 242 S.W. 1032 (1922); Myers v. State, 77 Tex. Crim. 239,
177 S.W. 1167 (1915); Johnson v. State, 44 Tex. Crim. 332, 71 S.W. 25 (1902); Sawyer v.
State, 39 Tex. Crim. 557, 47 S.W. 650 (1898); Burrell v. State, 18 Tex. 713 (1857).
s 391 U.S. at 515-16 n.9.
241d. at 522-23 n.21.
25 Id.
